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Abstract Negative biases in implicit self-evaluation are
thought to be detrimental to subjective well-being and have
been linked to various psychological disorders, including
depression. An understanding of the neural processes un-
derlying implicit self-evaluation in healthy subjects could
provide a basis for the investigation of negative biases in
depressed patients, the development of differential psycho-
therapeutic interventions, and the estimation of relapse risk
in remitted patients. We thus studied the brain processes
linked to implicit self-evaluation in 25 healthy subjects
using event-related potential (ERP) recording during a
self-relevant Implicit Association Test (sIAT). Consistent
with a positive implicit self-evaluation in healthy subjects,
they responded significantly faster to the congruent (self–
positive mapping) than to the incongruent sIAT condition
(self–negative mapping). Our main finding was a topo-
graphical ERP difference in a time window between 600
and 700 ms, whereas no significant differences between
congruent and incongruent conditions were observed in
earlier time windows. This suggests that biases in implicit
self-evaluation are reflected only indirectly, in the additional
recruitment of control processes needed to override the
positive implicit self-evaluation of healthy subjects in the
incongruent sIAT condition. Brain activations linked to
these control processes can thus serve as an indirect measure
for estimating biases in implicit self-evaluation. The sIAT
paradigm, combined with ERP, could therefore permit the
tracking of the neural processes underlying implicit self-
evaluation in depressed patients during psychotherapy.
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How we see ourselves contributes markedly to our emotion-
al experience of the events in our surroundings. According-
ly, previous research has linked high self-esteem to
happiness, better psychological adjustment (Baumeister,
Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), and higher positive
and lower negative affect (Orth, Robins, & Widaman,
2012). Low self-esteem, in contrast, has been associated
with various psychological symptoms, such as depression
(Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2007; Orth,
Robins, Trzesniewski, Maes, & Schmitt, 2009), social anx-
iety (de Jong, 2002; Ginsburg, La Greca, & Silverman,
1998; Tanner, Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006), and bulimia
(Cockerham, Stopa, Bell, & Gregg, 2009; Vohs et al.,
2001). Furthermore, longitudinal studies suggest that low
self-esteem predicts depression, and is therefore thought to
be a key factor in the development and maintenance of
depression (Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004;
Sowislo & Orth, 2013). According to cognitive theories
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, 1995; Ingram,
1984; Teasdale, 1988), depression is characterized by neg-
atively biased information processing grounded in dysfunc-
tional self-schemata, and by related negative assumptions
about oneself that are assumed to originate from negative
emotional experiences in the past (Beck, 1967). These self-
schemata are thought to be only partly accessible to con-
scious reflection (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000),
and thus at best are partially accessible by explicit self-
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reports such as questionnaires. Therefore, implicit methods
are an attractive approach to assess implicit self-evaluations
as part of subjects’ individual self-schemata.
The Implicit Association Test containing self-related
stimuli (sIAT) has been developed for measuring biases in
implicit self-evaluation (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). In
contrast to self-reports based on conscious, and therefore
explicit self-evaluations, the sIAT is a computerized catego-
rization task that relies on differences in reaction times (RTs)
to measure the individual implicit association strength be-
tween two concept categories (self/not self) and two attri-
bute categories (positive attributes/negative attributes). The
rationale behind the sIAT is that the mapping of two closely
associated categories to the same response key allows faster
responses than does the mapping of two weakly associated
categories. Healthy subjects usually display faster responses
when self and positive attributes are mapped to the same
button. Therefore, we refer to self–positive mapping as the
congruent condition, whereas self–negative mappings rep-
resent the incongruent condition.
To date, different explanations for IAT RT differences have
been proposed. The original explanation posited was that the
congruent condition is “easier” to perform than the incongru-
ent condition because concepts that are mapped together
exhibit stronger associations or semantic connections
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). A closely related
explanation assumes that the familiarity of a concept makes it
more or less salient, and that the observed RT differences are
due to a salience asymmetry between congruent and incon-
gruent conditions (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Another
set of potential explanations has focused on additional cogni-
tive resources that are particularly needed in the incongruent
condition. For example, one account suggests that more ex-
tensive evaluation processes in the incongruent condition are
responsible for the observed IAT RTeffect (Brendl, Markman,
& Messner, 2001). Similarly, IAT RT differences have been
linked to differential costs of task switching in the congruent
and incongruent conditions (Mierke & Klauer, 2001). An
investigation of the brain processes observed during sIAT
performance could help to delimit the cognitive processes
underlying the observed behavioral sIAT effect.
Previous behavioral studies using the sIAT have repeat-
edly demonstrated positive implicit self-evaluations in
healthy subjects (De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, & De Houwer,
2006; Franck et al., 2007; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). In
addition, recent studies, including a longitudinal multicenter
study, have shown that depressed individuals exhibit more
negative implicit self-evaluations than control subjects
(Glashouwer & de Jong, 2010; Risch et al., 2010). As earlier
studies reported no differences between depressed and
healthy subjects (De Raedt, et al., 2006; Franck, De Raedt,
& De Houwer, 2008; Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy,
2001), however, some variability is present in the literature.
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that nega-
tive implicit self-evaluation could be an important aspect of
depression that can be tracked using the sIAT paradigm.
To our knowledge, the sIAT itself has not been investi-
gated using neuroimaging methods to date. However, sev-
eral event-related potential (ERP) and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have successfully delin-
eated brain activations in the context of other, not self-
referential IAT paradigms investigating, for example, im-
plicit concept associations (Chee, Sriram, Soon, & Lee,
2000), beliefs about race and gender (Knutson, Mah, Manly,
& Grafman, 2007), ingroup/outgroup attitudes (Hurtado,
Haye, González, Manes, & Ibáñez, 2009; Ibáñez et al.,
2010), and implicit moral attitudes (Luo et al., 2006). These
studies have mainly focused on activation differences be-
tween congruent and incongruent IAT conditions. ERP stud-
ies have commonly identified differences in both late
(Coates & Campbell, 2010; Hurtado, et al., 2009; Williams
& Themanson, 2011) and, to a lesser degree, early (Coates
& Campbell, 2010; Forbes et al., 2012; Ibáñez et al., 2010)
ERP components as a function of IAT condition. fMRI
studies have emphasized an important role of activations
in the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, as
well as in the anterior cingulate cortex, in the control pro-
cesses that are needed to override the implicit associations in
order to correctly perform the IAT on incongruent trials
(Chee et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2006).
Here, our aim was to characterize the temporal dynamic
of brain activity involved in sIAT performance using elec-
troencephalography (EEG) recording. We expected that the
initial processing stages (ERPs < 120 ms) would not differ
across the sIAT conditions, since the task conditions
employed identical stimuli, and therefore did not differ with
regard to stimulus characteristics, perceptual processing, or
overall emotional valence (Vogel & Luck, 2000). In an
intermediate timewindow around 200 to 400ms poststimulus,
we expected to find enhanced ERP amplitudes for the con-
gruent sIAT condition, on the basis of previous ERP findings
using self-relevant stimulus materials. For example, enhanced
intermediate ERP components were reported during viewing
of one’s own, as compared with other, familiar or unfamiliar
faces (Keyes, Brady, Reilly, & Foxe, 2010), as well as during
processing of sentences referring to the self rather than to
others (Fields & Kuperberg, 2012). Our expectation was
based on the notion that healthy subjects exhibit positive
implicit self-evaluations, reflected in a close association of
positive—rather than negative—attributes with the self. In a
late time window, from 400 ms poststimulus onward, we
expected to find variations in the electrical field topography
between congruent and incongruent sIAT conditions, mainly
on the basis of previous fMRI results showing that additional
brain regions are recruited during the performance of incon-
gruent IAT conditions. These additional activations are
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thought to be involved in the control processes necessary for
overriding implicit associations and generating the required
behavioral response.
We supplemented these analyses by applying the
sLORETA model for source localization, in an effort to
estimate brain regions that might underlie observed ampli-
tude or topographic ERP modulations. The sLORETA mod-
el assumes that the voltage changes between adjacent voxels
are gradual, and on this basis selects the solution of source
magnitudes that is maximally smooth (Pascual-Marqui,
2002). It is important to note that EEG source localization
is an ill-posed inverse problem that requires additional as-
sumptions and provides more or less likely approximations,
but no provable evidence about source localization. Further-
more, sLORETA is only appropriate for estimating the
center of an area of activation, but not for assessing or
quantifying the extent of the activated area (Luck, 2005).
Nevertheless, this approach offers the opportunity to gener-
ate hypotheses about brain regions potentially involved in
sIAT performance on the basis of an explicit model and to
link our ERP data to the existing fMRI literature.
In an intermediate time window (around 200 ms
poststimulus), we expected sources to fall mainly into cor-
tical midline regions that have been linked to self-referential
processing (for a review, see Amodio & Frith, 2006;
D’Argembeau & Salmon, 2012; Northoff & Bermpohl,
2004; van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010),
notably the medial prefrontal cortex. Previous neuroimaging
studies of self-evaluation processing have generally focused
on the neural correlates of explicit self-reflection, and there-
fore have used paradigms based on explicit evaluations, in
which subjects were asked to reflect on their own attitudes,
abilities, or personal traits (e.g., Fossati et al., 2003; Johnson
et al., 2002; Schmitz, Kawahara-Baccus, & Johnson, 2004).
In contrast, the self-evaluations during the sIAT paradigm
used in our study were made implicitly, and might well
involve distinct neural processes. However, the few studies
that have directly compared implicit and explicit evaluations
of self-relevance (Moran, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2009) and
self-referent evaluations (Rameson, Satpute, & Lieberman,
2010) have observed the recruitment of overlapping cortical
midline structures in both implicit and explicit conditions.
In a late time window (400 ms onward), we expected
sources to be located mainly in brain regions that have been
linked to control processes recruited during incongruent
sIAT trials as well as conflict monitoring, most notably the
dorso- and ventrolateral prefrontal and the anterior cingulate
cortex (Chee et al., 2000; Luo et al., 2006).
Elucidating the activations during sIAT performance in
healthy subjects can provide information on the neural pro-
cesses and networks involved in implicit self-evaluations.
This can serve as a baseline for studying alterations in
implicit self-evaluation in depressed patients, and generate
hypotheses on the development and maintenance of depres-
sion. It could further be used to track particular aspects of
neural activations during the course of psychotherapy—for
example, allowing the identification of patients that are at




Data were obtained from 26 healthy subjects. All were native
German speakers, and two of the subjects were raised bilin-
gually. One subject had to be excluded from further analysis
because of poor quality of the EEG recordings, leaving a
sample of 14 female and 11 male subjects, whose mean age
was 25 years (SD = 5.4, range = 21–48). Of these 25 subjects,
22 were right handed. All subjects were initially screened for
depression or other psychiatric disorders using the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IVAxis I Disorders, and none of
them reported a current psychological disorder or a history of
depression. Afterward, they completed a demographic infor-
mation questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II;
Beck, Steer, & Brown, 2006), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale (RSES), which is a widely used ten-item self-report scale
measuring global self-esteem (Collani & Herzberg, 2003).
The study was approved by the cantonal ethics commit-
tee in Bern, Switzerland, and all subjects provided informed
consent before participating.
Task and stimuli
In the present study, we used a German version of the well-
established self-esteem Implicit Association Test (sIAT;
after Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).
As in other studies, we used self- and not-self-related pro-
nouns that have been commonly used as concept categories
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005;
Risch et al., 2010) instead of individually generated self- and
not-self-related words, in order to avoid idiosyncratic con-
founds due to semantic associations (Steffens, Kirschbaum,
& Glados, 2008). The lists of positive and negative attributes
consisted of ten personal attributes, each selected from the
item pool used by Gemar et al. (2001; see the Appendix for all
of the sIAT stimuli). All stimuli appeared in the middle of a
computer screen in black letters against a white background,
and subjects were asked to assign the stimuli as quickly as
possible by pressing one of two response keys. The rules of
category–response mappings changed from block to block,
and a reminder was presented throughout the block in the
upper left and right hand corners of the screen. The reminder
consisted of the currently active mapping rule (in one corner
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[“self/positive” or “self/negative”] and in the opposite corner
[“others/negative” or “others/positive”]). In the congruent
block, subjects had to press the same response button for
stimuli referring to “self” and “positive attributes,” whereas
the other response button was required for “not-self” and
“negative attributes.” In the incongruent block, “self” and
“negative attributes” were assigned to one response button,
whereas the other response button had to be pressed for “not
self” and “positive attributes.” Subjects were not required to
correct their incorrect responses, but they received feedback
via a red “X” in the middle of the screen.
Before performing the sIAT in combination with EEG
measurement, each subject completed a short practice IAT
(pIAT) composed of stimuli with minimal self-relevance and
emotional valence (farm/traffic, animals/vehicles), so as to
become familiar with the structure and the response modal-
ities of the IAT task. The practice IAT contained only four
shortened blocks (five trials each), composed of two dis-
crimination blocks, which primed the button mappings for
the following congruent (farm–animals, traffic–vehicles) and
incongruent (farm–vehicles, traffic–animals) test blocks.
To minimize possible serial-order effects on the sIAT mea-
sures, we presented blocks of the congruent (C) condition and
the incongruent (I) condition of the sIAT two times each, so
that half of the subjects performed blocks in the order “CIIC,”
whereas the other half performed blocks in “ICCI” order.
Thus, sIAT applied here contained ten blocks, with Test
Blocks 3, 5, 8, and 10 being proceeded by discrimination
blocks (of ten trials each) that primed the button mappings
of the following congruent (76 trials) or incongruent (76 trials)
blocks (see Table 1). After the first five sIAT blocks, and
following the end of the sIAT, the congruent and incongruent
test blocks of the pIAT (76 trials each) were presented. The
data measured during the pIAT will be reported elsewhere.
Our behavioral and ERP analyses focused exclusively on self-
trials (self–positive and self–negativemappings) and excluded
the other-trials (other–positive and other–negative mappings),
because our intention was to examine attitudes toward the self,
and we did not want our findings to be confounded by possi-
ble biases in attitudes toward others.
In each trial, the stimulus was presented for 1,500 ms,
followed by a blank screen with a randomly jittered duration
ranging from 2,000 to 2,200 ms, resulting in a mean stim-
ulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 3,600 ms. The completion
of all blocks required 40 min. Because subjects could take
rest periods of self-determined lengths between blocks, the
sIAT task lasted between 43 and 55 min. E-Prime (version
2.0, Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA)
was used to present stimuli and to collect RT data.
Procedure and EEG recording
We placed the EEG cap on the head of each subject and
mounted 70 sintered silver chloride ring electrodes on the
cap according to the international 10–10 system. Two addi-
tional electrodes were placed underneath the eyes in order to
record the electrooculogram (EOG). EEG was recorded with
a Nihon-Kohden Neurofax 1100 system while subjects com-
pleted the sIAT. Fz was the recording reference electrode,
and the electrode impedance was kept below 20 kΩ. The
EEG was online band-pass filtered (0.3–120 Hz), and the
data were digitalized with a sampling rate of 500 Hz.
Data analysis
Analysis of behavioral data
We compared accuracy and RTs for the congruent and
incongruent self-trials (self–positive vs. self–negative
Table 1 Arrangement of the
IAT blocks in the case of “CIIC”
order
IAT Block Left Label(s) Right Label(s) No. of Trials
sIAT 1 Discrimination self other 10
sIAT 2 Discrimination positive negative 10
sIAT 3 Test self/positive other/negative 76
sIAT 4 Discrimination negative positive 10
sIAT 5 Test self/negative other/positive 76
pIAT Test farm/animals traffic/vehicles 76
pIAT Test traffic/animals farm/vehicles 76
sIAT 6 Discrimination other self 10
sIAT 7 Discrimination positive negative 10
sIAT 8 Test other/positive self/negative 76
sIAT 9 Discrimination negative positive 10
sIAT 10 Test other/negative self/positive 76
pIAT Test farm/vehicles traffic/animals 76
pIAT Test traffic/vehicles farm/animals 76
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mappings) of the sIAT. To test for significant differences in
the amount of incorrect responses between conditions, we
applied a paired-samples t test and further calculated the
percentages of correct responses in the congruent and in-
congruent trials.
For the RT analyses, we adapted the improved scoring
algorithm by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) to our
ERP measurement: That is, we analyzed only trials with RTs
above 300 ms and below 3,100 ms, and replaced the RTs of
error trials with the mean of the individual RTs of correct
trials plus 600 ms. This kind of error penalty has previously
shown superior resistance to contamination related to
response-speed differences among subjects (Greenwald et
al., 2003). Then, we calculated the individual mean RT for
congruent and incongruent trials.
We applied a paired-samples t test to test for significant
RT differences between the two conditions. Finally, we
calculated the individual behavioral IAT effect by
subtracting the individual mean RT in congruent trials from
the individual mean RT in incongruent trials and by normal-
izing these differences by the individual standard deviation
of response times across the congruent and incongruent
trials. Thus, the sIAT effect quantified the behavioral self-
evaluation bias, and positive scores denoted positive implic-
it self-evaluations.
Analysis of EEG data
Preprocessing and data reduction Artifact rejection was
performed offline using the Brain Vision Analyser software
(Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany). Eye move-
ment artifacts were corrected by means of an independent
component analysis (ICA; Jung et al., 2000; Tran, Craig,
Boord, & Craig, 2004) that was used to identify and subse-
quently remove components corresponding to blinks or
vertical and horizontal eye movements. Channels that
contained other artifacts, such as muscle artifacts or artifacts
resulting from perspiration, were interpolated by averaging
data from adjacent electrodes. (Note that for ten subjects, no
channel had to be interpolated; in 12 subjects, one channel,
and in three subjects, two channels were interpolated.) After
these steps, the data were recomputed against an average
reference, and epochs containing further artifacts were ex-
cluded manually. A band-pass filter from 0.1 to 20 Hz
(Grieder et al., 2012; Khateb, Pegna, Landis, Mouthon, &
Annoni, 2010; Wirth et al., 2008) and a 50-Hz notch filter
were applied. Individual ERPs were computed by averaging
epochs from 0 to 1,000 ms poststimulus separately for
congruent and incongruent self-trials. For both the congru-
ent and incongruent conditions, an average of 64 artifact-
free segments (ranges among subjects: for congruent, 47–
74; for incongruent, 52–74) were included. Finally, the
grand mean ERPs for the congruent and the incongruent
conditions were computed by averaging the respective indi-
vidual ERPs.
Analysis of amplitude differences To quantify differences in
overall amplitude between the two conditions, we used the
global field power (GFP; Lehmann & Skrandies, 1980). The
significance of GFP differences was established using a
simple randomization test that estimated the distribution of
GFP differences under the null-hypothesis by randomly
permuting the GFP of the two experimental conditions
5,000 times in each subject (Manly, 1997). When the prob-
ability that the measured difference was obtained by chance
was smaller than 5 %, this was taken as evidence for a
quantitative difference in the activation of the generators
involved in the processing of congruent as compared with
incongruent trials. The test was initially applied separately
for each time point of the entire analysis-window therefore,
further analyses to protect against false positives due to
multiple testing were applied (see below).
Analysis of topographical differences The topographic anal-
ysis of variance (TANOVA) is a global way to determine
topographic differences between conditions. In contrast to
channel-wise comparisons, the TANOVA computes the global
dissimilarity of whole electrical field topographies between
the ERP grand means of the two conditions for each sampling
point and determines the significance of these topographic
differences with a nonparametric randomization test (Koenig
& Melie-García, 2009; Strik, Fallgatter, Brandeis, & Pascual-
Marqui, 1998). Before computing the TANOVA, the analyzed
data were normalized (GFP = 1) so that significant differences
between conditions could only be accounted for by different
topographies resulting from different source distribution, and
not by different strength of source activation alone. For the
computation of the TANOVAs, the RAGU program was used
(Koenig, Kottlow, Stein, & Melie-García, 2011) with a single
within-subjects factor (congruent/incongruent), 5,000 ran-
domization runs, and a p threshold at .05. As with the GFP,
the TANOVAwas computed for each time point.
Since the assessment of GFP and topographic differences
was computed separately for each time point, our analyses
needed some protection against false positive results due to
multiple testing. To address this issue, an additional random-
ization test on the count of consecutive time frames with
significant differences in comparison with the count of con-
secutive significant time frames that would be expected under
the null hypothesis was computed (Koenig et al., 2011;
Koenig & Melie-García, 2009). TANOVA and GFP results
were reported only if the count of consecutive significant time
frames was higher than could be expected by chance (p < .05).
Source estimation Given that differences in topography of
the scalp electric field must result from differences in the
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underlying neural generators, the inverse resolution meth-
od standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic to-
mography (sLORETA; Pascual-Marqui, 2002) was applied
to approximate brain regions putatively responsible for the
observed topographic differences between the two condi-
tions. The sLORETA assumes similar orientations and
neuronal strengths of neighboring sources and computes
the “smoothest” of all possible intracerebral distributions
of the current density that are consistent with the observed
scalp electric field topographies. For the time windows
that showed significant topographical differences,
voxelwise t tests on the normalized and log-transformed
current density data were conducted. Since sLORETA was
restricted to the time window that had already shown
significant topography differences, we applied no further
correction for multiple comparisons. In the chosen imple-
mentation, sLORETA was based on a boundary element
head model and on 6,239 equally spaced voxels (5-mm
grid) distributed in the gray matter of the MNI152 average
brain template (Pascual-Marqui, 2002).
Correlation of behavioral and electrophysiological data In
a further analysis, we aimed to identify ERP sources that
were activated proportional to the behavioral IAT effect. The
rationale for this analysis was that if there were a consistent
set of sources showing activation proportional to the IAT
effect, this would results in a single topography being added
to the ERP in proportion to the IAT effect. This topography
can be extracted using covariance mapping (Koenig, Melie-
García, Stein, Strik, & Lehmann, 2008). The assessment of
the significance of such covariance maps is called
TANCOVA and follows randomization procedures that are
equivalent to those used for the TANOVA. TANCOVAs
with the IAT effect were computed for the ERPs of the
congruent and incongruent, and for the ERP difference
between these two conditions. As above, TANCOVAs were
computed for each time point and an overall test on the
duration of significant effects was applied.
In order to retrieve the topography that was modulated
proportional to the behavioral IAT effect, we first calcu-
lated IAT difference maps by subtracting the electric field
topographies (normalized ERPs) of the congruent trials
from the one of the incongruent trials. In a next step,
we computed the covariance of the behavioral IAT effect
and IAT difference map. In periods in which there was
evidence for a significant ERP correlate of the IAT effect,
the putative localization of the responsible regions was
estimated using voxel-wise correlations with the IAT effect
in the sLORETA inverse solutions. These sLORETA correla-
tion coefficients were thresholded at (p < .01, 23 dfs, r = .462);
no further correction for multiple testing was applied since the




We first present accuracy and RT data for our group of 25
subjects, comparing sIAT performance on congruent and
incongruent trials.
Accuracy Subjects made more incorrect responses in the
incongruent (M = 4.96, SD = 3.45) than in the congru-
ent (M = 2.20, SD = 2.57) trials. A paired-samples t test
yielded a significant difference between the number of
incorrect responses in congruent and incongruent trials
[t(24) = 4.872, p < .001]. On average, subjects
performed at 97 % accuracy in congruent trials and
93.5 % accuracy in incongruent trials, with all subjects
performing above 85 % accuracy in each condition.
Reaction time Subjects required less time to react to
congruent (M = 717.53 ms, SD = 85.55) than to incon-
gruent (M = 847.67 ms, SD = 101.93) trials (see Fig. 1).
A paired-samples t test indicated a significant RT difference
between congruent and incongruent trials [t(24) = 10.4,
p < .001]. To quantify effect size, we applied the im-
proved scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003), which
revealed a significant IAT effect of medium size (d =
0.56, SD = .25), with all subjects showing a positive
score. These results are thus consistent with the expected
faster execution of self-positive as compared to self-
negative mappings in healthy subjects.
Explicitly measured self-esteem (RSES) revealed a highly
positive explicit self-esteem (M = 26.95, SD = 2.2, range =
23–30) that was not significantly correlated with the sIAT
effect [two-tailed Pearson correlation, r(20) = .26, p = .27],


















Fig. 1 Mean reaction times and standard deviations for congruent and
incongruent sIAT trials. The asterisk denotes statistical significance
(paired t test, p < .05)
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Electrophysiological data
We proceed by presenting ERP results from the group of 25
subjects that were measured during the behavioral task
performance. An initial qualitative examination of the aver-
age ERPs (see Fig. 2b) revealed a positive bilateral positiv-
ity at about 100 ms, corresponding to a P1 potential
reflecting the visual evoked activity. At about 150 ms the
ERPs showed a N170 with a bilateral occipital negativity
and central positivity. Later on, at about 300 ms, a new
component developed with a typical P300 field configura-
tion (parietal positivity, frontal negativity). This component
had its maximal GFP around 500 ms (see Fig. 2a). Tracking
this component, we observed that it appeared to persist
longer for incongruent than for congruent trials, as is evident
in the ERPs at 700 ms in Fig. 2b.
Analysis of overall amplitude differences To quantify dif-
ferences in ERPs between congruent and incongruent trials,
we first examined GFP, which represents momentary signal
strength regardless of topographic modulations (see
Fig. 2a). The randomization tests (see the Method section)
revealed that congruence had no significant effect on GFP
modulations (all p values>.05).
Analysis of topographic differences We next examined the
variation in ERP topography across the scalp between con-
gruent and incongruent trials, which we quantified using a
topographic analysis of variance (TANOVA). Significant
topographic differences occurred only during a time win-
dow from 620 to 738 ms (p < .05). Note that although we
also observed topographic differences at earlier phases of
the ERPs, between 136 and 186 ms and between 412 and
462 ms, these effects fell below the significance threshold
after a conservative correction for multiple testing using the
count of consecutive significant time frames. We concluded
that there was a trend toward significance for the early ERP
differences, which will not be analyzed further here. We
focused further analyses on the statistically significant dif-
ference between congruent and incongruent ERPs observed
at about 700 ms, which resulted from a variation in ERP
topography occurring around this time.
Source estimation To approximate brain regions responsible
for the significant topographic difference between congruent
and incongruent ERPs, we applied sLORETA model to the
time window from 620 to 738 ms. A statistical analysis of
the individual LORETA density distribution revealed sever-
al clusters of voxels that differed in current density estimates
between congruent and incongruent trials. We found a num-
ber of clusters showing greater current density estimates for
incongruent than for congruent trials: Bilaterally, sLORETA
differences were localized in the anterior (BA 24) and
subgenual (BA 25) cingulate cortex, as well as in the
parahippocampal gyrus (BA 27, 28). Another cluster was
located in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (middle
frontal gyrus, BA 47). A cluster in the orbitofrontal cortex
(BA 25, 11) was more right lateralized. The two clusters
yielding greater current density estimates for the congruent
than for the incongruent trials were located in the left infe-
rior frontal gyrus (BA45) and the right superior frontal gyrus
(BA 6). The Talairach coordinates of the absolute maximal t
value of each cluster are listed in Table 2.
Correlation of behavioral and electrophysiological
data Finally, we were interested in identifying brain regions
whose activation covaried with the magnitude of the behav-
ioral IATeffect on a subject by subject basis. For this purpose,
we used a TANCOVA analysis, which yielded a significant
correlation between the IAT difference map and the behavioral
IAT effect in a time window between 550 to 710 ms. The
covariance map of this time window represented the scalp
field of those intracerebral generators that differed in activity
between the congruent and incongruent conditions by an
amount that was proportional to the behavioral IAT effect. It
showed a parietal negativity and an anterior and left temporal
positivity that became stronger with a larger behavioral IAT
effect, and likewise became weaker with a smaller IAT effect
(Fig. 3a). Neither the ERPs of the congruent trials nor the
ERPs of the incongruent trials on their own revealed a signif-
icant correlation with the behavioral IAT effect.
The significant correlation between the IAT difference
map and the behavioral IAT effect indicated that at least
one brain region showed changes in activation proportional
to the behavioral IAT effect. An sLORETA analysis was
thus applied in order to identify the brain regions that
showed changes in current density estimates proportional
to the IAT effect. For the critical time period, this analysis
revealed a positive association between the size of the
behavioral IAT effect and the size of the IAT difference in
current density estimates located in the right inferior frontal
gyrus (BA 44, 45), the bilateral precentral gyrus (BA 6), and
the right insula (BA 13), whereas a negative association was
located in the left insula (BA 13; see Fig. 3b).
Discussion
The main goal of the present study was to study temporal and
topographic aspects of ERP activity during implicit self-
evaluation using a sIAT paradigm. Behaviorally, in line with
previous studies (De Raedt et al., 2006; Franck et al., 2008;
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), a group of healthy subjects
responded significantly faster in congruent (self–positive
mappings) than in incongruent (self–negative mappings)
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trials. All of the subjects showed a positive sIAT effect, which
is indicative of the positive implicit self-evaluation expected
for healthy individuals. The sIAT-derived measure of self-
evaluation was nearly unrelated with an explicit measure of
self-esteem based on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. This is
in line with previous results showing no or only weak corre-
lations between implicit and explicit measures of self-
evaluation (Bosson et al., 2000; Franck, De Raedt, &
De Houwer, 2007; Meites, Deveney, Steele, Holmes, &
Pizzagalli, 2008), supporting the notion that implicit and
explicit measures reflect distinct aspects of self-evaluation.
Whereas explicit reports are conceptualized as being based
on conscious reflective and evaluative processes that are
thought to be influenced by contextual factors such as social
desirability (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 1998), implicit
measures are thought to reflect “introspectively unidentified
effects of the self-attitude” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 11)
and may thus more faithfully reflect internal biases related to
self-evaluation. Thus, we anticipated that the study of brain
processes during sIAT performance can provide insights into
the neural processes involved in self-evaluation.
As anticipated, we found no systematic ERP differences
during the initial period of stimulus processing (up to around
120 ms poststimulus), consistent with the fact that perceptual
stimulus processing, attention selection and emotional valence
extraction for individual attributes can in fact be expected to
be similar between congruent and incongruent trials. During
an intermediate period, between about 200 and 400 ms, we
had expected, on the basis of previous findings (Fields &
Kuperberg, 2012; Keyes et al., 2010), to find that implicit
biases in self-evaluation would be reflected in ERP amplitude
differences. However, we did not observe any significant ERP
amplitude or topographic differences in this time window,
although there was a trend toward higher amplitudes in the
congruent condition. This suggests that processing in the
intermediate period is largely similar between congruent and
incongruent sIAT conditions, and may therefore reflect that
subjects’ inherent implicit self-evaluations were largely inde-
pendent of which stimulus was presented. Consistent with our
initial hypothesis, we did observe topographic ERP differ-
ences between congruent (self–positive mappings) and incon-
gruent (self–negative mappings) sIAT trials in a time window
from 620 to 738 ms following stimulus onset. In congruent
trials, the assignment rule was the same for self and positive
attributes, in line with the positive implicit self-evaluation in
healthy subjects. It is therefore straightforward for subjects to
follow this assignment rule, which corresponds to their im-
plicit association. In contrast, in incongruent trials (self–neg-
ative mappings), subjects have to detect the conflict between
the implicit self-evaluation and the sIAT assignment rule, and
override the response tendency resulting from their implicit
association in order to generate the required response. This
countermanding of subjects’ inherent predispositions requires
cognitive inhibition and control processes. We consider it
likely that these inhibitory and control processes are reflected
in the observed ERP activations in the late time window, and
are probably also responsible for the prolonged RTs on incon-
gruent trials. These findings supports the notion that the
recruitment of additional cognitive resources in the incongru-
ent condition underlies the behavioral IAT effect, as has been
proposed by several investigators (Brendl et al., 2001; Mierke
& Klauer, 2001).
Assuming that countering strong implicit associations re-
quires strong control processes, this result suggests that the
extent and magnitude of the ERP activity in the late time
window can serve as an index of implicit self-evaluation.
Thus, whereas we could not directly detect early ERP activity
reflecting implicit association strength, the late ERP activity
corresponding to control processes may serve as an indirect
measure of implicit self-evaluations in the sIAT paradigm.
The time course of the ERP we observed in our task is
generally similar to that found in previous studies investi-
gating IAT paradigms by using ingroup/outgroup face stim-
uli (Hurtado et al., 2009) as well as homo- and heterosexual
couple images (Williams & Themanson, 2011), particularly
in terms of the presence of robust congruent/incongruent
differences in a late time window. The results relating to
early ERP differences are more variable (Ibáñez et al., 2010;
O’Tolle & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). For example, one study
has reported differences as early as 170 ms post-stimulus-
onset that were likely due to the discrimination of configu-
ration aspects of the stimuli (ingroup/outgroup faces and
valence) used in this study (Ibáñez et al., 2010). Generally,
the available evidence suggests that ERP differences for
combined effects (congruent and incongruent associations)
tend to be more robust in late than in early time windows,
consistent with our present findings showing a nonsignifi-
cant trend in early ERPs and robust late ERP effects.
We used source localization to estimate brain structures
whose activity might contribute to the ERP topographic dif-
ferences during the late time window. The results of these
analyses are summarized in Table 2. On the basis of previous
Fig. 2 a Global field power (GFP) curves for the grand mean event-
related potentials (ERPs) of the congruent and incongruent conditions.
b Momentary maps and difference maps showing the topographic
effect of the congruent and incongruent ERPs, as well as the difference
maps (incongruent—congruent). The time frame of the topographic
effect is indicated by the vertical bar. c Source estimation: Voxelwise t
values comparing the sLORETA present source density for the time
period of 620 to 738 ms between the congruent and incongruent
conditions. The incongruent condition showed significantly more acti-
vation in clusters in the anterior cingulate gyrus (a), the subgenual
anterior cingulate gyrus (b), the right middle frontal gyrus (c), the
orbitofrontal cortex (d), and bilateral parahippocampal gyrus (e),
whereas the congruent condition showed more activation in small
clusters in the left inferior frontal gyrus (f) and the right superior frontal
gyrus (not shown). All of the voxels reaching the threshold for p < .01
[uncorrected for multiple comparisons, t(24) = 2.8] are color coded
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fMRI literature, we expected the source localization to identi-
fy activations in the ventrolateral (VLPFC) and dorsolateral
(DLPFC) prefrontal and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
Indeed, the VLPFC and ACC were among a number of brain
regions where the sLORETA inverse solution showed stron-
ger activation in the incongruent sIAT condition.
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been previously
associated with conflict monitoring (Botvinick, 2007; Carter
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& van Veen, 2007; Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, 2000; Kerns
et al., 2004) and the control of goal-directed behavior
(Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; Kerns et al., 2004). The ACC tends
to show enhanced activity when there is a high level of
conflict in the stimulus material regarding the required behav-
ioral response (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen,
1999), and it seems to detect conflict especially at later,
response-related levels of processing (van Veen, Cohen,
Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). This suggests that the
enhanced ACC activity that we identified by sLORETA as a
potential neural generator during the sIAT task may have
resulted from a response conflict. Such a conflict may have
occurred because negative attributes have to be mapped to the
self in the incongruent condition, contradicting the implicit
positive self-evaluation of the healthy subjects. In conflicting
situations, inadequate behavioral response tendencies often
need to be suppressed or inhibited, so that the conflict can
be resolved and the desired response can be made.
The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is another brain region
that has been implicated in this kind of inhibitory cognitive
control of behavior (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004;
Buchsbaum, Greer, Chang, & Berman, 2005; Chikazoe,
2010; Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2010).
Not surprisingly, many fMRI studies have found coactivation
Table 2 Localization of the to-
pographic effects in the sIAT
with sLORETA
For each of the significant clus-
ters, the table indicates the
hemisphere and Brodmann area
(BA) of the most significant
voxel in the cluster. The coordi-
nates indicate the absolute max-
imal t values of the clusters
reaching the threshold for
p < .01 [uncorrected for multiple
comparisons, t(24) = 2.8] in a
voxelwise t-value comparison of
the sLORETA current source
densities in the congruent and
incongruent conditions for the
time period of 620–738 ms
Topographic Effect (620–738 ms) Talairach Coordinates t Value
Structures R/L BA x y z
incongruent > congruent
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 24 0 25 22 −3.45
subgenual ACC 25 0 0 −4 −4.15
subgenual ACC 33 0 21 22 −3.36
medial frontal gyrus R 25 5 9 −17 −3.33
medial frontal gyrus L 25 −5 9 −17 −3.36
subcallosal gyrus 25 0 4 −13 −3.38
subcallosal gyrus R 34 10 4 −13 −3.29
subcallosal gyrus L 34 −10 4 −13 −3.81
rectal gyrus R 11 5 13 −22 −3.08
middle frontal gyrus R 47 30 38 −10 −2.86
parahippocampal gyrus R 27 10 −34 −2 −2.95
parahippocampal gyrus L 28 −15 −5 12 −2.86
superior temporal gyrus R 38 20 8 −34 −2.93
congruent > incongruent
inferior frontal gyrus L 45 −50 20 8 2.86
superior frontal gyrus R 6 20 3 64 2.87
Fig. 3 a Covariance map for the association of the IAT difference map
and the behavioral IAT effect. b sLORETA source localization for the
association between the IAT difference map and the behavioral IAT
effect. A threshold of r = .462, corresponding to a p value of .01
(uncorrected for multiple comparisons), was chosen. The sources were
localized in right inferior frontal gyrus (a), bilateral precentral gyrus
(b), and bilateral insula (c)
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of the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices in tasks in-
volving conflicts and action selection (Nee,Wager, & Jonides,
2007; Niendam et al., 2012). One example is the go/no-go
paradigm, in which elevated activity in both the ACC and the
vlPFC has been reported in the no-go condition (Liddle,
Kiehl, & Smith, 2001; Nakata et al., 2008). In the no-go
condition, subjects need to exert inhibitory control to withhold
a behavioral response triggered by the stimulus material. Our
sLORETA analyses suggest that these control processes, me-
diated jointly by the ACC and vlPFC, were also engaged in
the incongruent sIATcondition in order to inhibit the response
tendency resulting from the positive implicit self-evaluation.
This finding is consistent with previous fMRI studies that
have used various IAT-based paradigms, examining concep-
tual associations (Chee et al., 2000) or moral prejudice (Luo et
al., 2006), and it highlights the robust nature of the cognitive
control related activity in these brain areas during the IAT.
Source localization suggested that several additional brain
regions were associated with sIAT performance. We discuss
the most prominent regions below, while noting that
sLORETA-based localization only identifies one of the many
possible solutions to the inverse problem, and thus these
observations remain somewhat speculative and must be
complemented by fMRI or PET experiments. One of the
additional brain regions identified by source localization is
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which showed enhanced ac-
tivity during the incongruent IAT condition. This is compati-
ble with fMRI literature implicating the OFC in cognitive
control processes (Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004)
such as response selection (Young & Shapiro, 2011) and
decision making (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000), al-
though previous IAT brain imaging studies have not described
any OFC activation during the incongruent condition.We thus
consider it possible, that the right hemisphere lateralized OFC
activation is attributable to the self-related character of the
sIAT: In incongruent trials, negative attributes are mapped to
the self, which may activate internal self-representations that
the subjects want to avoid, being called self-related prevention
goals. Such an interpretation is in line with findings of a recent
study (Eddington et al., 2009) describing right lateralized
OFC activity in depressed patients when being confronted
with their individual prevention goals. This interpretation is
also consistent with previous studies associating right prefron-
tal structures with processing self-referential information
(Kaplan, Aziz-Zadeh, Uddin, & Iacoboni, 2008; Nitschke,
Sarinopoulos, Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006).
Interestingly, source localization estimated two areas of the
frontal lobe, the left inferior frontal gyrus and the right supe-
rior frontal gyrus, as showing higher activity in the congruent
condition. Activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus has been
observed during self-referential tasks (Ochsner et al., 2004),
and has been linked to inner speech (Morin & Michaud,
2007). Accordingly, we speculate that the activation of the
left inferior frontal gyrus in our study could reflect internal
verbalizations that may be stronger for positive attributes
corresponding to the implicit self-evaluation. The greater ac-
tivation during congruent trials in the superior frontal gyrus,
which is part of the supplementary motor area (SMA), might
reflect the earlier start of motor response preparation.
Finally, we used sLORETA to identify brain regions in
which, across subjects, activity was correlated with RT differ-
ences between congruent and incongruent conditions that we
had quantified using the behavioral IAT effect. As was men-
tioned above, these sLORETA results can only represent pos-
sible approximations to the real underlying ERP sources, and
must be interpreted with caution. The sLORETA-based sources
that correlated with behavioral performance, listed in Table 3,
included the precentral gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the
insula bilaterally. The brain areas showing mostly positive
correlations with the sIAT effect fall into two classes: The
precentral gyrus is part of the motor system and thus the
significant correlation could be due to earlier response
Table 3 sLORETA localization
of the timeframe with significant
TANCOVA effects
For each of the significant clus-
ters, the table indicates the
hemisphere and Brodmann area
(BA) of the most significant
voxel in the cluster
TANCOVA Talairach Coordinates r Value
Structures R/L BA x y z
Inferior frontal gyrus R 44 45 15 13 .48
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 59 15 18 .49
Inferior frontal gyrus R 9 59 6 23 .49
Precentral gyrus R 6 59 1 23 .49
Precentral gyrus L 6 −45 −3 46 .48
Insula R 13 40 15 13 .48
Insula L 13 −30 20 8 –.50
Supramarginal gyrus R 40 59 −48 21 .47
Superior temporal gyrus R 22 64 −48 21 .49
Cuneus L 23 −5 −72 13 .47
Cuneus R 18 0 −72 13 .50
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execution on congruent trials. The remaining brain areas, nota-
bly inferior frontal gyrus and insula, are not closely related to
motor preparation or execution, but instead have been linked to
selective attention, response selection and inhibitory cognitive
control (Aron et al., 2004; Chechko et al., 2012; Chikazoe,
2010). This suggests that in our task, activation in these areas is
related to control processes recruited during the incongruent
condition, particularly in subjects with strong behavioral sIAT
effects that are indicative of highly positive self-evaluations.
Some limitations of the present study should be acknowl-
edged. First, we applied a rather conservative statistical crite-
rion (count of consecutive significant time frames), so the
present study might have missed some short lasting effects
in the early phase of the ERPs. Furthermore, the subjects in
our study were mostly young, highly educated individuals,
and all exhibited a highly positive explicit self-esteem, so our
results can only be generalized to a limited extent. A final
issue concerns possible individual differences in sIAT perfor-
mance strategies. Since we have no knowledge of their indi-
vidually applied strategies, some subjects might have focused
their response choice more on the rules for the other-attribute
mapping, whereas others might have focused mainly on rules
for self-attribute mapping. Further studies are necessary to
assess such strategies and their impact on sIAT performance
and the corresponding neural correlates.
Taken together, we have shown that cognitive control
processes that are needed to override response tendencies
resulting from implicit associations can be identified and
mapped to a number of frontal lobe brain structures. Activity
in these structures therefore appears suitable to quantify the
strength of implicit self-evaluations on a neural level. The
relative strength of these activations might be a useful indica-
tor for tracking the implicit self of patients suffering from
depression, potentially providing a quantitative tool for
assessing benefits of psychotherapeutic interventions and
identifying patients with an elevated risk of relapse. For ex-
ample, cognitive therapy is assumed to foster reflective cor-
rection of negative information processing. It might therefore
thus reduce depressive symptoms primarily by focusing on
explicit negative self-evaluations, while not fully addressing
underlying, negative implicit biases based on self-schemata
originating from past emotional experiences. To prevent per-
sistence of the resulting elevated vulnerability for depression,
therapeutic interventions are needed that especially target and
modify the implicitly represented aspects of the self-schemata.
Emotion-focused therapy (EFT; Greenberg & Watson,
2006), might be an attractive candidate in this context, since
the emotions underlying the patients schematic self-
representations are activated, differentiated and transformed
by adaptive emotional experiences discrepant to the previ-
ous maladaptive experiences. The combination of treatment
principles from EFT and from exposure-based treatment of
trauma (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), as realized in exposure-
based cognitive therapy for depression (EBCT; Hayes,
Beevers, Feldman, Laurenceau, & Perlman, 2005), is a
promising emerging psychotherapeutic approach. EBCT in-
cludes exposure interventions targeting experiential avoidance
and preventing avoidant behavior, as well as interventions
aimed at facilitating emotional and cognitive processing
(Grosse Holtforth et al., 2012). In EBCT, providing informa-
tion inconsistent with the maladaptive self-associations might
trigger corrective cognitive–emotional experiences that initi-
ate therapeutic change in negatively biased implicit self-
representations (Castonguay & Hill, 2012). These change
processes are assumed to allow for more sustainable schema
change and symptom change to take place (Ellison,
Greenberg, Goldman, & Angus, 2009), making patients less
vulnerable to relapse.
Table 4 sIAT stimuli
Category (German Word) Attributes (German Word)
Self Not-Self Positive Negative
self (selbst) others (andere) sociable (gesellig) timid (furchtsam)
I (ich) you (ihr) enthusiastic (begeistert) unattractive (unattraktiv)
me (mich) you (euch) cheerful (fröhlich) useless (nutzlos)
my (mein) yours (eure) composed (gelassen) rejected (angelehnt)
me (mir) yours (euer) lively (lebhaft) unwanted (unerwünscht)
open (offen) helpless (hilflos)
free (frei) weak (schwach)
sincere (aufrichtig) passive (passiv)
calm (ruhig) inferior (minderwertig)
adventurous (unternehmungslustig) shy (schüchtern)
Appendix
896 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:885–899
References
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: The medial
frontal cortex and social cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience,
7, 268–277.
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004). Inhibition and
the right inferior frontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8,
170–177. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.010
Baumeister, R. F., Campbell, J., Krueger, J. I., & Vohs, K. D. (2003).
Does high self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal
success, happiness, or healthier lifestyles? Psychological Science
in the Public Interest, 4, 1–44.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, deci-
sion making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10,
295–307.
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental and theoretical
aspects. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive
therapy of depression. New York, NY: Guilford.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (2006). BDI-II—beck
depressions-inventar (2nd ed.). Frankfurt, Germany: Harcourt
Test Services GmbH.
Beck, J. S. (1995). Cognitive therapy: Basics and beyond. New York,
NY: Guilford.
Bosson, J. K., Swann, W. B., Jr., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Stalking
the perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the
elephant revisited? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
79, 631–643.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making:
Reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulate function. Cog-
nitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356–366.
doi:10.3758/CABN.7.4.356
Botvinick, M. M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J.
D. (1999). Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anteri-
or cingulate cortex. Nature, 402, 179–181. doi:10.1038/46035
Brendl, C. M., Markman, A. B., & Messner, C. (2001). How do
indirect measures of evaluation work? evaluating the inference
of prejudice in the Implicit Association Test. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 81, 760–773.
Buchsbaum, B. R., Greer, S., Chang, W. L., & Berman, K. F. (2005).
Meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of the Wisconsin card-
sorting task and component processes. Human Brain Mapping,
25, 35–45.
Carter, C. S., & van Veen, V. (2007). Anterior cingulate cortex and
conflict detection: An update of theory and data. Cognitive, Af-
fective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 367–379. doi:10.3758/
CABN.7.4.367
Castonguay, L. G., & Hill, C. E. (2012). Transformation in psycho-
therapy: Corrective experiences across cognitive-behavioral, hu-
manistic, and psychodynamic approaches. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Chechko, N., Kellermann, T., Zvyagintsev, M., Augustin, M.,
Schneider, F., & Habel, U. (2012). Brain circuitries involved in
semantic interference by demands of emotional and non-
emotional distractors. PLoS One, 7, e38155. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0038155
Chee, M. W. L., Sriram, N., Soon, C. S., & Lee, K. M. (2000).
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the implicit association of
concepts and attributes. NeuroReport, 11, 135–140.
Chikazoe, J. (2010). Localizing performance of go/no-go tasks to
prefrontal cortical subregions. Current Opinion in Psychiatry,
23, 267–272.
Coates, M. A., & Campbell, K. B. (2010). Event-related potential
measures of processing during an Implicit Association Test.
NeuroReport, 21, 1029–1033.
Cockerham, E., Stopa, L., Bell, L., & Gregg, A. (2009). Implicit self-
esteem in bulimia nervosa. Journal of Behavior Therapy and
Experimental Psychiatry, 40, 265–273.
Cohen, J. D., Botvinick, M., & Carter, C. S. (2000). Anterior cingulate
and prefrontal cortex: Who’s in control? Nature Neuroscience, 3,
421–423. doi:10.1038/74783
Collani, G., & Herzberg, P. Y. (2003). Eine revidierte Fassung der
deutschsprachigen Skala zum Selbstwertgefühl von Rosenberg.
Zeitschrift für Differenzielle und Diagnostische Psychologie, 24,
3–7.
Cunningham, W. A., Raye, C. L., & Johnson, M. K. (2004).
Implicit and explicit evaluation: fMRI correlates of valence,
emotional intensity, and control in the processing of attitudes.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16 , 1717–1729.
doi:10.1162/0898929042947919
D’Argembeau, A., & Salmon, E. (2012). The neural basis of semantic
and episodic forms of self-knowledge: Insights from functional
neuroimaging. Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology,
739, 276–290.
de Jong, P. J. (2002). Implicit self-esteem and social anxiety: Differ-
ential self-favouring effects in high and low anxious individuals.
Behavior Research and Therapy, 40, 501–508.
De Raedt, R., Schacht, R., Franck, E., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Self-
esteem and depression revisited: Implicit positive self-esteem in
depressed patients? Behavior Research and Therapy, 44, 1017–
1028.
Dillon, D. G., & Pizzagalli, D. A. (2007). Inhibition of action, thought,
and emotion: A selective neurobiological review. Applied and
Preventive Psychology, 12, 99–114.
Eddington, K. M., Dolcos, F., McLean, A. N., Krishnan, K. R.,
Cabeza, R., & Strauman, T. J. (2009). Neural correlates of idio-
graphic goal priming in depression: Goal-specific dysfunctions in
the orbitofrontal cortex. Social Cognitive and Affective Neurosci-
ence, 4, 238–246.
Ellison, J. A., Greenberg, L. S., Goldman, R. N., & Angus, L.
(2009). Maintenance of gains following experiential therapies
for depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,
77, 103–112.
Fields, E. C., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2012). It’s all about you: An ERP
study of emotion and self-relevance in discourse. NeuroImage,
62, 562–574.
Foa, E. B., & Rothbaum, B. O. (1998). Treating the trauma of rape.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Forbes, C. E., Cameron, K. A., Grafman, J., Barbey, A., Solomon, J.,
Ritter, W., et al. (2012). Identifying temporal and causal contribu-
tions of neural processes underlying the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 320. doi:10.3389/
fnhum.2012.00320
Fossati, P., Hevenor, S. J., Graham, S. J., Grady, C., Keightley, M. L.,
Craik, F., et al. (2003). In search of the emotional self: An fMRI
study using positive and negative emotional words. The American
Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 1938–1945.
Franck, E., De Raedt, R., & De Houwer, J. (2007). Implicit but not
explicit self-esteem predicts future depressive symptomatology.
Behavior Research and Therapy, 45, 2448–2455.
Franck, E., De Raedt, R., & De Houwer, J. (2008). Activation of latent
self-schemas as a cognitive vulnerability factor for depression:
The potential role of implicit self-esteem. Cognition and Emotion,
22, 1588–1599.
Franck, E., De Raedt, R., Dereu, M., & Van den Abbeele, D.
(2007). Implicit and explicit self-esteem in currently de-
pressed individuals with and without suicidal ideation. Jour-
nal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 38,
75–85.
Gemar, M. C., Segal, Z. V., Sagrati, S., & Kennedy, S. J. (2001).
Mood-induced changes on the Implicit Association Test in
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:885–899 897
recovered depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
110, 282–289.
Ginsburg, G. S., La Greca, A. M., & Silverman, W. K. (1998). Social
anxiety in children with anxiety disorders: Relation with social
and emotional functioning. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychol-
ogy, 26, 175–185.
Glashouwer, K. A., & de Jong, P. J. (2010). Disorder-specific auto-
matic self-associations in depression and anxiety: Results of the
Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety. Psychological
Medicine, 40, 1101–1111.
Greenberg, L. S., & Watson, J. C. (2006). Emotion-focused therapy for
depression. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition:
Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychology Review,
102(1), 4–27.
Greenwald, A. G., & Farnham, S. D. (2000). Using the implicit
association test to measure self-esteem and self-concept. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 1022–1038.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measur-
ing individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit as-
sociation test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
1464–1480.
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding
and using the implicit association test: I. An improved scoring algo-
rithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197–216.
Grieder, M., Crinelli, R. M., Koenig, T., Wahlund, L. O., Dierks, T., &
Wirth, M. (2012). Electrophysiological and behavioral correlates
of stable automatic semantic retrieval in aging. Neuropsychologia,
50, 160–171.
Grosse Holtforth, M., Hayes, A. M., Sutter, M., Wilm, K., Schmied, E.,
Laurenceau, J.-P., et al. (2012). Fostering cognitive–emotional
processing in the treatment of depression: A preliminary investi-
gation in exposure-based cognitive therapy. Psychotherapy and
Psychosomatics, 81, 259–260. doi:10.1159/000336813
Hayes, A.M., Beevers, C., Feldman, G. C., Laurenceau, J. P., & Perlman,
C. (2005). Avoidance and processing as predictors of symptom
change and positive growth in an integrative therapy for depression.
International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 12, 111–122.
Hedden, T., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2010). Shared and selective neural
correlates of inhibition, facilitation, and shifting processes during
executive control. NeuroImage, 51, 421–431.
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H., & Schmitt, M.
(2005). A meta-analysis on the correlation between the implicit
association test and explicit self-report measures. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1369–1385.
Holroyd, C. B., & Yeung, N. (2012). Motivation of extended behaviors
by anterior cingulate cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16,
122–128.
Hurtado, E., Haye, A., González, R., Manes, F., & Ibáñez, A. (2009).
Contextual blending of ingroup/outgroup face stimuli and word
valence: LPP modulation and convergence of measures. BMC
Neuroscience, 10, 69. doi:10.1186/1471-2202-10-69
Ibáñez, A., Gleichgerrcht, E., Hurtado, E., González, R., Haye, A., &
Manes, F. F. (2010). Early neural markers of implicit attitudes: N170
modulated by intergroup and evaluative contexts in IAT.Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 4, 188. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00188
Ingram, R. E. (1984). Toward an information-processing analysis of
depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 8, 443–477.
Johnson, S. C., Baxter, L. C., Wilder, L. S., Pipe, J. G., Heiserman, J.
E., & Prigatano, G. P. (2002). Neural correlates of self-reflection.
Brain, 125, 1808–1814.
Jung, T. P., Makeig, S., Humphries, C., Lee, T. W., McKeown, M. J.,
Iragui, V., et al. (2000). Removing electroencephalographic arti-
facts by blind source separation. Psychophysiology, 37, 163–178.
Kaplan, J. T., Aziz-Zadeh, L., Uddin, L. Q., & Iacoboni, M. (2008).
The self across the senses: An fMRI study of self-face and self-
voice recognition. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3,
218–223.
Kerns, J. G., Cohen, J. D., MacDonald, A. W., III, Cho, R. Y., Stenger,
V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Anterior cingulate conflict moni-
toring and adjustments in control. Science, 303, 1023–1026.
Keyes, H., Brady, N., Reilly, R. B., & Foxe, J. J. (2010). My face or yours?
event-related potential correlates of self-face processing. Brain and
Cognition, 72, 244–254. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2009.09.006
Khateb, A., Pegna, A. J., Landis, T., Mouthon, M. S., & Annoni, J. M.
(2010). On the origin of the N400 effects: An ERP waveform and
source localization analysis in three matching tasks. Brain Topog-
raphy, 23, 311–320.
Knutson, K. M., Mah, L., Manly, C. F., & Grafman, J. (2007). Neural
correlates of automatic beliefs about gender and race. Human
Brain Mapping, 28, 915–930.
Koenig, T., Kottlow, M., Stein, M., & Melie-García, L. (2011). Ragu: A
free tool for the analysis of EEG and MEG event-related scalp field
data using global randomization statistics. Computational Intelli-
gence and Neuroscience, 2011(938925), 1–14. doi:10.1155/2011/
938925
Koenig, T., & Melie-García, L. (2009). Statistical analysis of
multichannel scalp field data. In C. M. Michel, T. Koenig, D.
Brandeis, L. R. R. Gianotti, & J. Wackermann (Eds.), Electrical
neuroimaging (pp. 169–190). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Koenig, T., Melie-García, L., Stein, M., Strik, W., & Lehmann, C.
(2008). Establishing correlations of scalp field maps with other
experimental variables using covariance analysis and resampling
methods. Clinical Neurophysiology, 119, 1262–1270.
Lehmann, D., & Skrandies, W. (1980). Reference-free identification of
components of checkerboard-evoked multichannel potential
fields. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology,
48, 609–621.
Liddle, P. F., Kiehl, K. A., & Smith, A. M. (2001). Event-related fMRI
study of response inhibition. Human Brain Mapping, 12, 100–
109.
Luck, S. J. (2005). ERP localization. In S. J. Luck (Ed.), An introduc-
tion to the event-related potential technique (1st ed., pp. 267–
300). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Luo, Q., Nakic, M., Wheatley, T., Richell, R., Martin, A., & Blair, R. J.
(2006). The neural basis of implicit moral attitude—an IAT study
using event-related fMRI. NeuroImage, 30, 1449–1457.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.11.005
Manly, B. F. J. (1997). Randomization, bootstrap, and Monte Carlo
methods in biology (2nd ed.). London, UK: Chapman & Hall.
Meites, T. M., Deveney, C. M., Steele, K. T., Holmes, A. J., &
Pizzagalli, D. A. (2008). Implicit depression and hopelessness in
remitted depressed individuals. Behavior Research and Therapy,
46, 1078–1084.
Mierke, J., & Klauer, K. C. (2001). Implicit association measurement
with the IAT: Evidence for effects of executive control processes.
Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie, 48, 107–122.
Moran, J. M., Heatherton, T. F., & Kelley, W. M. (2009). Mod-
ulation of cortical midline structures by implicit and explicit
self-relevance evaluation. Social Neuroscience, 4, 197–211.
doi:10.1080/17470910802250519
Morin, A., & Michaud, J. (2007). Self-awareness and the left inferior
frontal gyrus: Inner speech use during self-related processing.
Brain Research Bulletin, 74, 387–396.
Nakata, H., Sakamoto, K., Ferretti, A., Gianni Perrucci, M., Del Gratta,
C., Kakigi, R., et al. (2008). Somato-motor inhibitory processing
in humans: An event-related functional MRI study. NeuroImage,
39, 1858–1866. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.10.041
Nee, D. E., Wager, T. D., & Jonides, J. (2007). Interference resolution:
Insights from a meta-analysis of neuroimaging tasks. Cognitive,
Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 1–17.
898 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:885–899
Niendam, T. A., Laird, A. R., Ray, K. L., Dean, Y. M., Glahn, D. C., &
Carter, C. S. (2012). Meta-analytic evidence for a superordinate
cognitive control network subserving diverse executive functions.
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 12, 241–268.
Nitschke, J. B., Sarinopoulos, I., Mackiewicz, K. L., Schaefer, H. S., &
Davidson, R. J. (2006). Functional neuroanatomy of aversion and
its anticipation. NeuroImage, 29, 106–116.
Northoff, G., & Bermpohl, F. (2004). Cortical midline structures and
the self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 102–107.
O’Tolle, C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2009). Electrophysiological activ-
ity generated during the implicit association test: A study using
event-related potentials. Psychological Record, 59, 207–220.
Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H., Hanelin, J.,
Ramachandran, T., Glover, G., et al. (2004). Reflecting upon
feelings: An fMRI study of neural systems supporting the attri-
bution of emotion to self and other. Journal of Cognitive Neuro-
science, 16, 1746–1772. doi:10.1162/0898929042947829
Ormel, J., Oldehinkel, A. J., &Vollebergh,W. (2004). Vulnerability before,
during, and after a major depressive episode: A 3-wave population-
based study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 61, 990–996.
Orth, U., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H., Maes, J., & Schmitt, M.
(2009). Low self-esteem is a risk factor for depressive symptoms
from young adulthood to old age. Journal of Abnormal Psychol-
ogy, 118, 472–478.
Orth, U., Robins, R. W., & Widaman, K. F. (2012). Life-span devel-
opment of self-esteem and its effects on important life outcomes.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 1271–1288.
Pascual-Marqui, R. D. (2002). Standardized low-resolution brain elec-
tromagnetic tomography (sLORETA): Technical details. Methods
and Findings in Experimental and Clinical Pharmacology,
24(Suppl. D), 5–12.
Rameson, L. T., Satpute, A. B., & Lieberman, M. D. (2010). The neural
correlates of implicit and explicit self-relevant processing.
NeuroImage, 50, 701–708. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.098
Risch, A. K., Buba, A., Birk, U., Morina, N., Steffens, M. C., &
Stangier, U. (2010). Implicit self-esteem in recurrently depressed
patients. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychi-
atry, 41, 199–206.
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2004). Underlying processes in the
implicit association test: Dissociating salience from associations.
Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 133, 139–165.
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.2.139
Schmitz, T. W., Kawahara-Baccus, T. N., & Johnson, S. C. (2004).
Metacognitive evaluation, self-relevance, and the right prefrontal
cortex. NeuroImage, 22, 941–947.
Sowislo, J. F., & Orth, U. (2013). Does low self-esteem predict de-
pression and anxiety? a meta-analysis of longitudinal studies.
Psychological Bulletin, 139, 213–240. doi:10.1037/a0028931
Steffens, M. C., Kirschbaum, M., & Glados, P. (2008). Avoiding
stimulus confounds in implicit association tests by using the
concepts as stimuli. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47,
217–243.
Strik, W. K., Fallgatter, A. J., Brandeis, D., & Pascual-Marqui, R. D.
(1998). Three-dimensional tomography of event-related potentials
during response inhibition: Evidence for phasic frontal lobe acti-
vation. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology,
108, 406–413.
Tanner, R. J., Stopa, L., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Implicit views of the
self in social anxiety. Behavior Research and Therapy, 44, 1397–
1409. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2005.10.007
Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression.
Cognition and Emotion, 2, 247–274.
Tourangeau, R., Rips, L. J., & Rasinski, K. (1998). The psychology of
survey response. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Tran, Y., Craig, A., Boord, P., & Craig, D. (2004). Using independent
component analysis to remove artifact from electroencephalo-
graphic measured during stuttered speech. Medical & Biological
Engineering & Computing, 42, 627–633.
van der Meer, L., Costafreda, S., Aleman, A., & David, A. S. (2010).
Self-reflection and the brain: A theoretical review and meta-
analysis of neuroimaging studies with implications for schizo-
phrenia. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 935–946.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.12.004
van Veen, V., Cohen, J. D., Botvinick, M. M., Stenger, V. A., & Carter,
C. S. (2001). Anterior cingulate cortex, conflict monitoring, and
levels of processing. NeuroImage, 14, 1302–1308.
Vogel, E. K., & Luck, S. J. (2000). The visual N1 component as an index
of a discrimination process. Psychophysiology, 37, 190–203.
Vohs, K. D., Voelz, Z. R., Pettit, J. W., Bardone, A. M., Katz, J.,
Abramson, L. Y., . . . Joiner, T. E., Jr. (2001). Perfectionism, body
dissatisfaction, and self-esteem: An interactive model of bulimic
symptom development. Journal of Social and Clinical Psycholo-
gy, 20, 476–497.
Williams, J. K., & Themanson, J. R. (2011). Neural correlates of the
implicit association test: Evidence for semantic and emotional
processing. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6,
468–476.
Wirth, M., Horn, H., Koenig, T., Razafimandimby, A., Stein, M.,
Mueller, T., . . . Strik, W. (2008). The early context effect
reflects activity in the temporo-prefrontal semantic system:
Evidence from electrical neuroimaging of abstract and con-
crete word reading. NeuroImage, 42, 423–436. doi:10.1016/
j.neuroimage.2008.03.045
Young, J. J., & Shapiro, M. L. (2011). The orbitofrontal cortex and
response selection. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1239, 25–32. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06279.x
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2013) 13:885–899 899
